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OVERVIEW
Mobilizing domestic revenues efficiently is a priori-
ty for the Government of Poland, but it is not easy.
There are numerous instruments that can be used
to achieve this objective. Traditional measures to
boost government revenues include changes to the tax
legislation and reforms in the area of tax administra-
tion. Such measures can have a large fiscal impact,
but are often politically challenging to design and
negotiate, and can take time to implement. Beha-
vioral interventions often focus on adapting existing
systems and processes and can thus be implemented
relatively quickly and at a low cost. Overall, they are
an additional tool in the policy toolkit that country
authorities have to improve tax compliance, and
thus complement but do not substitute traditional
measures to establish effective tax collection systems
including changes in tax legislations and tax admi-
nistration reforms. Behavioral interventions can
also help the Tax Authority to align its strategy more
accurately to taxpayer behavior. The Polish authori-
ties were interested in applying insights from beha-
vioral economics to their communications with tax-
payers to see if making small changes could promote
tax compliance.
This paper summarizes the results of a randomized
controlled trial (RCT) that used letters to remind tax-
payers in Poland to pay their taxes. These taxpayers
had declared their personal income tax (PIT) for the
2015 fiscal year but had failed to pay what they owed by
the deadline, April 30, 2016 (i.e., taxpayers in arrears).
The trial took place between May and August 2016 and
covered a total of 149,925 individual taxpayers.
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The trial had two objectives: (1) test the effect of
different behavioral messages on income tax comp-
liance, and (2) test whether how the letters were deli-
vered (regular versus registered mail) had an effect
on compliance. Taxpayers were randomly assigned
to receive the official enforcement letter (a ‘dunning
letter’) used by the Polish Tax Office or one of nine
letters that were adapted using behavioral design.
Figure 1 summarizes the design of the experiment.
Of the nine adapted letters, one was a standard beha-
vioral letter that was clear, concise, and conformed
to many of the best practices from the tax-compliance
literature. The other eight letters were identical to
the first except that to the plain reminder each added
a different persuasive message meant to prompt
action by the recipients. The messages expressed eco-
nomic, moral, pride, self-image, and reciprocity con-
cepts. The ranking of behavioral letters with respect
to the payment rate and payment amount is presen-
ted in Figure 2.
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This trial built on lessons from a pilot experiment in 2015, when the World Bank and the UK Behavioural Insights Team supported
the authorities in designing and conducting a trial in two regions, Lubuskie and Wielkopolskie, which compared the results from one
behavioral letter with those from the dunning letter.
Figure 1. Sample Size and Treatment Assignments
Source: Data from the Polish authorities.
To test whether sending a letter by regular or by
registered mail affected tax compliance outcomes,
an additional group of taxpayers was sent the original
dunning letter by registered mail.
Five key messages emerged from this experiment:
Message 1: Behavioral letters significantly
improved tax compliance relative to
the dunning letter
Behavioral letters helped to achieve higher rates of pay-
ment and higher payment amounts. Of taxpayers who
received the dunning letter, 40.2 percent paid. Of those
who received the behavioral letters, 42.9 to 48.6 percent
paid.
The most successful behavioral letter had a deter-
rence message and framed nonpayment not as over-
sight but as an intentional and deliberate choice.
This letter yielded an increase in the payment rate of
8.4 percentage points (pp) above the dunning letter
– a 20.8 percent increase in the number of compliant
taxpayers. The least effective behavioral letter had
a public goods message noting how not paying taxes
affected the provision of preschools, schools, roads,
and safety. While this was the least effective beha-
vioral letter, it still significantly increased the pay-
ment rate over the dunning letter by 6.7 percent.
The payment rate for taxpayers who were sent the
standard behavioral letter was 46.3 percent – 6.1 pp
more than for recipients of the dunning letter. Such
a change represents a 15.2 percent increase in the
number of compliant taxpayers. Similarly, all be-
havioral letters mobilized higher average PIT pay-
ments than the control group. As with the payment
rate, the letter that combined messages about the
omission and deterrence was the most effective
in mobilizing higher payments. The average payment
amount per letter was PLN 347 more than the dun-
ning letter sent by regular mail.
Message 2: ‘Hard-tone’ messages were
more effective than ‘soft-tone’ messages
Taxpayers reacted more to messages that had a har-
der tone than to those that had a milder, softer, tone.
In this report, the hard-tone messages are deterrent
messages that highlight sanctions for noncompliance
or that frame nonpayment as an intentional and de-
liberate choice. By contrast, the soft-tone messages
highlight social incentives, such as public goods or
social norms. Overall, hard-tone messages were more
effective – taxpayers were more likely to pay the
income tax due, pay higher amounts of taxes, and
reduce their tax liabilities (their tax debt).
2
For
example, the payment rate among those taxpayers
who received a soft-tone message was 43.9 percent
(9 percent higher than the payment rate of 40.2 per-
cent in the control group who received the original
dunning letter), but the payment rate for those tax-
payers that received a hard-tone message was
46.9 percent (18 percent higher than for the control
group). With regard to payment amount, on average
the hard-tone messages mobilized more (PLN 93) than
soft-tone messages.
6 APPLYING BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS TO IMPROVE TAX COLLECTION
Figure 2. Key Results
Payment Rate Payment Amount
Source: Data from the Polish authorities.
Notes: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Stars indicate a significant difference from the control group (dunning letter) – *=0.1,
**=0.05, ***=0.01; daggers indicate a significant difference from the standard behavioral letter - †= 0.1., ‡=0.05, ‡‡=0.01.
2
In fact, as shown further in the report, adding some of the social messages actually reduces the impact of the letter compared to
the standard behavioral letter.
Message 3: The effectiveness of some of
the messages depended on taxpayers’
characteristics
The effect of a particular message varied depending
on the taxpayer’s age, gender, geographic location,
and amount owed. For example, the public goods mes-
sage helped to increase tax compliance among people
aged 20–29 but had a negative effect on the compliance
of those aged 50–64. Given the public goods listed
in the behavioral letter (preschools, schools, roads,
and safety), one possibility is that younger people
responded positively because they are more likely
to benefit from these than older people and are thus
more motivated to pay up when reminded of the public
goods benefits. If the heterogeneity observed is in fact
due to the choice of public goods mentioned, higher
compliance might be induced by adapting the types
of public goods mentioned in letters to the age groups
of recipients. Similarly, public good messages work
better in rural areas, possibly because of a tighter link
with the outcome of that kind of spending and the
relevance to community.
Message 4: Sending letters by regular mail
(the cheaper option) proved to be just
as effective as sending them
via registered mail
Analysis of the outcomes for the delivery-method
test found no statistical difference in payment rates
or payment amounts whether the dunning letter was
hand-delivered by registered mail or sent by regular
mail. This suggests that in Poland the tax admini-
stration (and other agencies) could generate useful
savings by replacing use of registered mail (PLN 14.96
per letter) to invoice taxpayers in arrears with delivery
by regular mail (PLN 9.20 per letter).
Message 5: Tax compliance among
taxpayers in arrears can be tackled
cost-effectively
A cost-benefit analysis revealed that if the most
effective letter had been sent to all 149,925 taxpayers
in the sample, the tax authority would have gene-
rated PLN 39,328,742 more in revenues than the
control group – the additional revenues would have
been 28 times larger than the cost of sending the
letters, including staff time.
3
The trial results make
a compelling case for rigorous testing of small adap-
tations of government communications with tax-
payers. They also demonstrate that communication
processes can be enhanced to promote tax comp-
liance at low cost and without the need for new
legislation.
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The Polish Tax Department estimates that the cost of sending a dunning letter by regular mail, including staff time costs,
is approximately PLN 9.20 sending it by registered mail would cost about PLN 14.96.
BACKGROUND
Mobilizing domestic revenues efficiently is a prio-
rity for the Government of Poland. In the past two
years there has been heightened emphasis on expan-
ding social programs in a fiscally sustainable way
– i.e., financed largely by increased revenue. The go-
vernment is therefore implementing fiscal measures
aimed at expanding the revenue base and also is look-
ing into its own processes and procedures which can
boost tax compliance. In the area of tax policy, in 2016
the Government introduced a new tax on financial
institutions and increased the progressivity of the
PIT. In March 2017 it started the implementation of
a comprehensive reform of the tax administration
in order to integrate tax and customs offices. These
traditional measures are often politically challenging
to design and negotiate and can take time to bring
tangible results. As they pursued tax policy and tax
administration reforms, the Polish authorities deci-
ded to see whether applying insights from behavioral
economics to their communications with taxpayers
– making small changes to regular processes – could
promote tax compliance quickly and at low cost.
In recent years, tax authorities in different coun-
tries have begun to experiment with different types
of communications (letters, emails, SMSs, web-
sites) using insights from the behavioral science
literature to persuade taxpayers to pay what they
owe in taxes. International evidence suggests that
behaviorally-informed reminders can affect tax beha-
vior, at least in some contexts. Results from a number
of trials have shown that applying behavioral insights
to tax communications can help to promote tax comp-
liance and both raise tax revenues and reduce admi-
nistrative costs. In these trials, tax authorities have
tested a variety of reminder messages highlighting
patriotic motives for paying taxes, social norms, pos-
sible sanctions, or information from third parties.
The World Bank has also been exploring the appli-
cations of behaviorally-informed policies. Its 2015
World Development Report, “Mind, Society, and Beha-
vior,” noted that applying behavioral insights had
been found to enhance the effectiveness of public po-
licy because people think automatically and socially
and often use mental models that are unconscious
– that is, they use heuristics and shortcuts that do not
always apply in a given context. They also tend to
think in terms of stories or narratives rather than
data points. These observations can help policy-
makers better align their communication strategies
with the behavior of citizens.
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Behavioral interventions to promote tax comp-
liance have proven to be cost-effective since they
generally involve modifications to existing systems
and processes. In recent years the impact of beha-
vioral interventions has been measured using rando-
mized controlled trials (RCTs), which are now widely
used in medicine, business, and international deve-
lopment. For example, the effectiveness of tax re-
minders has been tested using RCTs in a number
of countries including Australia, Argentina, Austria,
Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Germany, Guatemala,
Israel, Peru, Switzerland, the United States, the Uni-
ted Kingdom, and Venezuela.
5
A common feature of
these RCTs is that they are based on data already
collected by the tax authorities, and as such they
were implemented quickly and at low cost. Hence,
recent experience from other countries suggests that
behavioral interventions can be easily implemented,
replicated and scaled-up, stimulating a process of
continuous learning and enhancement of admini-
strative procedures.
Recent research has concentrated on using diffe-
rent behavioral messages to incentivize higher tax
compliance. Seminal research by the UK Behavioral
Insights Team (BIT) and the tax authority in the UK
had originally shown the efficacy of sending taxpayers
letters with behavioral messages. Some of the beha-
vioral messages tested invoked social norms, such as
how many people pay on time, or associated taxes
with gaining or losing public goods. Relative to the
control group, the former increased payment of de-
clared tax liabilities by up to 5.1 pp within 23 days of
delivery, and the latter (whether framing loss or gain)
increased payments by 1.6 pp (Hallsworth et al. 2014).
More recently, the World Bank worked closely with
tax authorities in Guatemala to design better commu-
nication strategies using these and other behavioral
insights. Letters sent to Guatemalans who had failed
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4
The report can be found at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2015.
5
See Blumenthal et al. 2001; Wenzel 2005; Torgler 2007; Kleven et al. 2011; Ariel 2012; Castro and Scartascini 2013; Del Carpio 2013;
Ortega and Sanguinetti 2013; Pomeranz 2013; Dwenger et al. 2014; Hallsworth et al., 2014; Kettle et al. 2016, and Brockmeyer et al. (2016).
to declare their income taxes in 2014 showed that,
in 11 weeks, the letter highlighting a social norm in-
creased the average amount paid per taxpayer by
$13.97 (210 percent), and the deliberate choice letter
(omission vs. commission) brought in $17.95 more
(269 percent) than not sending a reminder letter.
Remarkably, compliance by those who received these
two letters was also high in the next fiscal year (Kettle
et al. 2016, Brockmeyer et al. 2016) document similar
findings using email reminders in Costa Rica. Another
field experiment in Argentina sent behavioral letters
to payers of property tax with messages related either
to levels of enforcement (deterrence), social norms,
or provision of public goods, and found deterrence
to be the most effective. While the latter two had no
effects, the deterrence message increased compliance
by nearly 5 pp relative to the control group (Castro
and Scartascini 2013). Clearly, the effectiveness of
behavioral letters can vary. One important reminder
from the behavioral science literature is that con-
text matters greatly. Interventions that previously
worked in one setting may fail in others. Thus, while
evidence from other countries can provide insights
to inform the design of behavioral interventions, there
was still a need to experiment to see whether beha-
vioral insights can help promote tax compliance
in Poland.
In this context, the Polish tax authorities decided to
start testing if behavioral insights can strengthen
tax collection and promote higher tax compliance
in Poland. Due to methodological considerations
the authorities decided to focus its experiment on the
personal income tax (PIT) and implemented a pilot
experiment in 2015 to test the impact of behavioral
insights in promoting tax compliance. PIT revenues
constitute around 17.3 percent of all tax revenues and
correspond to around 2.5 percent of GDP (equivalent
to around PLN45 billion). The majority of PIT is paid
in the form of monthly advances by the employers
(around 85 percent of total PIT, i.e. PLN 39 billion).
Towards the end of the year, the employee is obliged
to submit a PIT statement to the tax office for the final
PIT resettlement. At this stage the outstanding liabi-
lity is paid or the tax office returns the paid tax due
to the use of tax breaks or tax credits. In 2015, the to-
tal tax liability to be paid by tax payers in end April
(for the fiscal year 2014) was around PLN 6 billion,
out of which around 30 percent is not collected by
the deadline. The analysis of historical taxpayer comp-
liance rates found that while the tax base has expan-
ded since 2011, more and more taxpayers do not pay
their taxes until after the statutory deadline, and the
share of those who do not pay at all (10 months after
the deadline) has also been heading up. At the same
time, the vast majority of taxpayers in arrears have
a very small tax liability (Figure 3 and 4). Such condi-
tions seemed conducive to behavioral interventions
in the form of letters to remind taxpayers to pay. In this
context, in 2015, with the support of the World Bank
and the UK Behavioural Insights Team, the Polish Tax
Administration carried out its first RCT trial. The expe-
riment targeted PIT taxpayers in arrears in two regions
of the country and tested the impact of two reminder
letters on tax compliance outcomes. The results of this
pilot trial are summarized in Annex 1.
This report summarizes the results of a nation-
-wide RCT conducted in 2016 that used letters
to remind taxpayers in Poland to pay their taxes.
The trial took place between May and August 2016 and
covered 149,925 individual taxpayers, that is, the uni-
verse of taxpayers in arrears in Poland. These tax-
payers had declared their PIT for the 2015 fiscal year
but had failed to pay what they owed by the deadline
of April 30, 2016.
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Figure 3. Share of Taxes by Payment Date
Source: Polish Ministry of Finance.
Figure 4. Share of Taxes Due Collected
by the End of May
EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGN
This RCT trial had two objectives: (1) to increase
PIT payments and identify key features of an effective
communication strategy; and (2) to test whether
the delivery method (registered vs. regular mail) had
an impact on tax compliance.
Taxpayers in arrears were defined as those who had
filed their PIT declarations on time (by April 30, 2016)
but had failed to pay their tax liability since. The trial
involved all taxpayers that had non-negligible net tax
liability (PLN 50 and above) and had not paid their
income tax for 2015 in full by May 13, 2016.
Two types of impact were tested:
• Impact of the content of the letters
• Impact of the delivery method (registered vs. regu-
lar mail)




Outcome indicators were measured at three intervals:
4, 8, and 12 weeks after the trial launch.
Table 1 shows the trial schedule:
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Table 1. Key Dates for the Experiment
Date Step
May 13, 2016 Cut-off date for identifying the sample
May 13–22, 2016 Randomization and preparation of letters
May 23, 2016 Roll-out: all letters are sent to taxpayers
June 13, 2016 End of the 1
st
monitoring round: until this date, there were no other attempts to contact
the taxpayers covered by the trial (i.e., the tax authority did not follow up with taxpayers
regarding their liability); under regular proceedings, tax offices undertake “soft execution”
measures, which implies that they would contact taxpayers in arrears by phone, e-mail,
text message, among other forms of communication.
July 4, 2016 End of 2
nd
monitoring round




The test measured three outcomes using anonymized
tax records for the 149,925 participants in the trial,
updated as of June 13, 2016 (four weeks after the Tax
Authority sent the letters). This sample covered all
taxpayers in arrears in Poland with liability above
50 PLN; excluded were taxpayers with no liability,
those for whom data were missing for the covariates
values, and outliers.
6
The cut-off date was chosen because until June 13,
2016, the tax administration did not intend to take
any other enforcement activities. After that date it is
harder to interpret the findings of the experiment
because other interventions occurred, such as tax
office enforcement activities. For example, a number
of taxpayers from all treatment arms that failed
to pay by June 13 were sent registered dunning let-
ters. Meanwhile executive proceedings were initiated
for taxpayers who had been sent the registered dun-
ning letter when the trial began. These factors could
have created confounding effects that might have
affected the validity of the estimates. By setting
June 13 as the cut-off, the estimates of the treatment
effects are not contaminated by other interventions
by the tax authority. Nonetheless, Annex 6 shows out-
comes based on payment to the latest date available
6
Outliers were identified as observations that, in the OLS regression of payment amount on treatments and all covariates,
had a residual of more than 2.5 standard errors.
as evidence suggesting the treatments had sustained
effects.
The Polish Tax Office collected outcome variables
regularly and automatically as administrative data.
The outcomes of interest are these:
• Payment (binary): dummy variable equal to one if
the taxpayer paid a non-zero amount of tax by the
given date, and zero otherwise.
• Payment amount (continuous): the total amount
paid by the taxpayer in PLN unconditional on pay-
ment.
• Log payment amount (continuous): the (log) amount
paid unconditional on payment.
• Log of the outstanding tax liability (continuous):
the total (log) amount of the taxpayer’s liability by
the given date.
The primary estimation consists of an intention-to-
-treat (ITT) analysis of the impact of the letters based
on the following regression model:
Y T X u
i i i




is the payment outcome, T
i
is a treatment
vector (T1= Dunning Letter (Control Group); T2= Baseline
Behavioral Letter, T3= Social Norm; T4= Public Good Posi-
tive; T5= Public Good Negative, T6= Deterrence, T7= Deter-
rence + Execution Order; T8= Omission, T9= Omission + De-
terrence, T10= Omission Taxpayer-Perspective), X i is a vec-
tor of control variables comprising the characteristics
of taxpayers (amount of tax liability, declaring child-
ren, type of tax form, gender, age, total taxable in-
come), and u
i
is the error term. Regression models
are evaluated by ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple
regression. In the OLS regressions heteroscedasticity
in u
i
is controlled for using robust standard errors.
To investigate the impact of the contents of letters,
first the behavioral letters are compared to the control
group, which was sent a dunning letter (via regular
mail). In this case, stars on the figures (*) indicate
a significant difference from the dunning letter.
7
Different behavioral letters are then compared to the
baseline behavioral letter to see which behavioral
messages were most effective in encouraging tax-
payers to comply. Statistical significance against the
baseline behavioral letter is indicated by daggers (‡).
The analysis mainly compares separate letters and
their performance compared to the control group
or the baseline behavioral letter.
To investigate the impact on tax compliance of the
delivery method (registered or regular mail), one treat-
ment group received a standard dunning letter deli-
vered by registered mail. In the separate model the
impact of the delivery method on the payment rate
is estimated. Specification of the regression model
is the same as in the previous comparison.
RANDOMIZATION
This was a randomized controlled trial. Randomiza-
tion as a method of experimental control has been
extensively used in both human clinical trials and
biological experiments and in the social sciences
for tests ranging from financial education and tax
repayment to organ donation. Conceptually, this is
a method for randomly allocating to one or more
intervention conditions. Thus, it is possible to com-
pare the effectiveness of different interventions
while minimizing both known and unknown factors
that may influence the outcome being investigated.
As a result, randomization produces comparable
groups and eliminates the source of bias in treat-
ment assignments.
Analysis of historical data regarding the payment
patterns of Polish taxpayers revealed important
characteristics affecting the probability of payment.
Based on administrative data for 2011–14 it was
possible to identify the key determinants of non-
compliance by Polish PIT taxpayers (Figure 5).
A number of factors had a statistically important
impact on compliance. For example, low tax liability
decreased the likelihood of payment by 13.5 percent
and PIT-36L declaration decreased it by 17.6 per-
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM POLAND 11
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The number of stars indicates significance difference from the control group: *=0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01; daggers indicate significance
difference from the standard behavioral letter †=0.1, ‡=0.05, ‡‡=0.01.
Figure 5. Determinants of Noncompliance
by Polish Taxpayers, Percent
Source: Polish authorities.
Note: Analysis refers to 2011–14 period. Bars above the axis indicate
determinants that lower tax compliance; bars below indicate
determinants that improve tax compliance.
cent. However, being female increased payment
probability by 1.9 percent and declaring children
increased it by 9.9 percent.
To ensure that the differences in taxpayer characte-
ristics do not affect the experiment, the procedure
chosen was stratified randomization, which prevents
imbalance between treatment groups for known
factors that influence prognosis or treatment respon-
siveness. For this experiment, randomization was
conducted at the individual level and stratification
was used for initial liability, tax code submitted, elec-
tronic submission, gender, parental status, marital
status, voivodship, and the age group. Given the high
dimensionality of the stratification, balance on each
of these variables could not be perfect, but as the
balance tests show, the sample was balanced across
the treatment groups.
8
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Figure 6. Balance Tests for the Sample
Source: Polish authorities.
Note: The difference between each treatment group and the control group in terms of covariates expressed in standard deviations.
TREATMENTS
The aim of this experiment was to check how different
letter content affects compliance measures: payment
rate, payment amount, and outstanding tax liability.
The sample covered 144,053 taxpayers in arrears each
of whom had a tax liability of more than PLN 50. Tax-
payers in this sample were randomly assigned to one
of 10 treatment groups, each of which received a letter
delivered by regular mail (Figure 7).
8
Full randomization was not possible because the covariates were derived from a different data sample (all taxpayers vs. the late taxpayers
in the trial sample). Other differences were tax liability (sample included only taxpayers who owed more than 50PLN at the date of
the experiment), and outliers were removed.
Figure 7. Sample Size and Treatment Assignments
Source: Polish authorities.
Control Group: Dunning Letter (n=6,091): This is the
original letter that the Polish Tax Office had been
sending to remind taxpayers to pay their taxes.
The dunning letter is normally sent by registered mail
but in the experiment was sent by regular mail.
The letter has a formal tone and sets out the legal
basis for this type of communication.
9
It states the tax
liability and asks the taxpayer to calculate the accrued
interest; it provides general guidelines for the calcu-
lation but does not provide an example. The letter has
a deterrent message, highlighting that “failure to per-
form [payment] by the indicated deadline shall result
in referral of the case to execution proceedings, there-
by generating costs of execution proceedings to be
covered first.”
The letter comes across as very formal, and the language
is convoluted, bureaucratic, and legalistic. It might be
very difficult for people with average reading skills
to understand. Similarly, the explanation of how to
calculate the interest rate calculation is difficult to
follow.
Behavioral Baseline Letter (n=15,232): A substantial
literature is evolving on the application of behavioral
science to social policy (e.g., Sunstein 2015). Such
terms as defaults, status quo bias, peer effects, simp-
licity, salience, immediate gratification, and recipro-
city have entered the dialog of policy-makers. Pro-
minent in the list of applications is tax compliance:
see Hallsworth et al. (2014) for an overview of early
work in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.
The standard dunning letter was therefore rewritten
to conform to many of the best practices from pre-
vious research:
• It begins with a very clear description of the pur-
pose of the letter and a “call-to-action” at the top,
explaining what the taxpayer must do and giving
a deadline: “Please pay your income tax by June 3,
2016.”
• It minimizes formal legal language to the extent
possible, partly so that recipients will understand
better but partly just to encourage them to read it.
• It specifies very concrete next steps regarding what
to do and how to do it.
• In a separate table, it lists the interest due on each
day until the deadline so that taxpayers do not need
to calculate it themselves and have additional
incentive to pay the liability before the deadline.
The letter now comes across as reader-friendly.
The sentences are much shorter, the language is
simple, and the messages are very clear. The letter
is highly prescriptive in terms of what is being asked
and clearly outlines the consequences of compliant
and noncompliant behavior. It also provides contact
information for the relevant tax authority so tax-
payers can notify or seek clarification quickly without
needing to look up the phone number themselves
(a possible cognitive barrier). It thus can be seen as
a plain reminder that addresses nonpayment due to
forgetfulness or oversight.
The other letters consist of the behavioral baseline
letter augmented with a brief section that includes
a behavioral message. In addition to the plain re-
minders, the behavioral messages are meant to
address different motives for nonpayment – econo-
mic, moral, and so on. Here, for explanatory clarity,
the behavioral messages are provided in a box before
the discussion of each. (Annex 7 contains the comp-
lete letters in the original Polish and translated into
English.)
Social Norm
The Social Norm Letter (n=15,474), is based on the ob-
servation that people generally have a natural prefe-
rence to do what their peers are doing. For instance,
Gerber and Rogers (2009) found that informing citi-
zens that 71 percent of their compatriots had voted
in the previous election increased voter turnout.
For taxes, Hallsworth et al. (2014) describe the suc-
cessful use of social norms to improve compliance
in the UK, as Kettle et al. (2016) did for Guatemala,
where although the true rate of payment is only
64.5 percent, saying that in the letter increased both
rates of payments and average amounts paid. One
additional aspect of the letter used here is that it gives
the actual rates by region rather than just nation-
wide; some research findings indicate that the closer
the reference or comparison group, the stronger the
effects of this type of norm (Goldstein et al. 2008).
Public Good Positive
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The Resolution of the Ministry of Finance from December 30, 2015 specifies procedures for creditors of monetary claims (Journal of Laws
of 2015, item 2367).
According to our records, [8] out of 10 residents
in [REGION OF THE TAXPAYER] have already
paid their income tax for 2015. You are part of
a minority that has not yet fulfilled that duty.
Are you aware that 37.79% of your personal
income tax goes to your municipality? From this
income, your municipality finances pre-schools,
schools, roads, and safety, benefiting everyone
in your municipality including yourself and your
family. Don’t be an irresponsible inhabitant of
your municipality and pay your delinquent taxes!
The Public Good Positive Letter (n=15,424) is based on
the assumption that people who knew what expendi-
tures are financed from tax revenues might be more
likely to pay their overdue taxes. Therefore, one objec-
tive of this letter was simply to inform citizens how
some of their taxes are spent and to remind them
that many services they use are available only be-
cause of tax revenues. This in itself is not necessarily
behavioral, but several other elements incorporate
behavioral science knowledge. The accurate and un-
usually precise figure of 37.79% focuses attention on
what comes next, unlike a generic claim about taxes
providing benefits. It also suggests that the govern-
ment is tracking everything closely. The link to muni-
cipal services brings everything closer to recipient
and family. The whole effort stimulates feelings of
reciprocity: one should do something in return for all
the benefits being received. Finally, the last sentence
engages a perceived identity for the recipients as
potentially responsible taxpayers rather than indi-
viduals who are letting down their communities and
neighbors; this pivots the message toward the sense
of self, not just the outward action.
Public Good Negative
The Public Good Negative Letter (n=15,350) is based on
the same assumption as the previous letter but
the behavioral framing is different. The motivation
behind this “negative” letter was to harness all the
stimulative aspects of the positive public good letter
and in addition to frame a loss. It is well-established
that decision makers respond more strongly to per-
ceived losses related to a status quo than to perceived
gains. In this case the implicit threat is that without
sufficient tax revenue, all the municipal benefits cur-
rently enjoyed may be lost.
Deterrence
The Deterrence Letter (n=15,442) uses the behavioral
letter with the addition of the deterrence message.
This message serves three goals. The first sentence
is meant to evoke a negative self-conscious emotion
of guilt, which has been proven to be a powerful
mediator to motivate moral action (Hoffman 1982a,
1982b; H. B. Lewis 1971; M. Lewis 1993). The second
sentence is intended to create a sense that the deter-
rence threat is serious, and the third sentence gives
concrete examples of the punishment actions. The
examples are likely to evoke mental imagery that
enhances realism and therefore behavioral intentions
(see, e.g., Miller and Marks 1997; Yoo and Kim 2014).
Thus, together the last two sentences are meant
to create a sense of fear of possible consequences,
which can be an important cause of law-abiding
or norm-respecting behavior (Haidt 2003).
Deterrence + Execution Order
The Deterrence + Execution Order Letter (n=15,292) rein-
forces the threat of punishment for noncompliance
and makes the punishment more palpable by provi-
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Are you aware that 37.79% of your personal
income tax goes to your municipality? Without
this income, your municipality cannot finance
pre-schools, schools, roads, and safety, damaging
everyone in your municipality including your-
self and your family. Don’t be an irresponsible
inhabitant of your municipality and pay your
delinquent taxes!
Not paying taxes places an unfair burden on all
other the taxpayers, who have honestly fulfilled
their duty. We are therefore determined, more
than ever, to collect taxes from those, who avoid
Not paying taxes places an unfair burden on all
the taxpayers who have honestly fulfilled their
duty. We are therefore determined, more than
ever, to collect taxes from those who avoid pay-
ing them. As part of the execution procedures,
we can, for example, block your bank account
or salary and in addition you will have to cover
all execution expenses that arise.
We attach a sample Execution Order Form that
we send to taxpayers who have not paid the taxes
due.
So far, we have thought of your payment delay
to be accidental. However, if you disregard this
notice, we will consider it an intentional choice
of yours and think of you as a dishonest tax-
payer.
10
The Execution Order is defined in the Resolution of the Ministry of Finance from May 16, 2014, (J. L. of 2014, item 650).
The example of the Execution Order can be found here:
http://www.mf.gov.pl/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=665fa5c2-0834-40fb-94f8-4395c687671e&groupId=764034 ; please also see Annex 8.
paying them. As part of the execution procedures,
we can, for example, block your bank account,
salary, and, in addition, you will have to cover
all execution expenses that arise.
The Omission vs. Commission Letter (n=15,249) mes-
sage is that dishonesty is a deliberate choice. Most
real decisions have a status quo alternative: doing
nothing or maintaining one’s current or previous de-
cision. Numerous studies have found that indivi-
duals tend disproportionately to stick with the status
quo (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988 and Anderson
2003), for two reasons: (1) the losses from acting may
loom larger than the gains (Tversky and Kahneman
1981); and (2) moral violations tend to be judged less
harshly when the violation results from inaction
rather than action (DeScioli et al. 2012). Individuals
may use the ambiguity and uncertainty associated
with acts of omission in order to minimize future
psychological costs arising from the threat to self-
-image of acting dishonestly (Hallsworth 2013; Mazar
et al. 2008).
This message is intended to overcome the status
quo bias toward doing nothing – by framing the
dishonest behavior as a deliberate choice – an action
in itself. By notifying the reader that failure to
comply will be treated as a deliberate choice to be
a dishonest taxpayer, this messages aims to elimi-
nate omission as an excuse for noncompliance, thus
increasing both the cognitive dissonance around
the taxpayer’s self-image of an honest person and
the perceived cost of paying later. The wording also
gives taxpayers an exemption for not previously de-
claring, which introduces an element of reciprocity,
because the implication is that the taxpayers have
been granted a favor or shown good will. The text
is also worded to give the impression that taxpayer
behavior is being closely monitored, which may
heighten the perceived threat of subsequent actions
against noncompliance. Thus it acts as a mild deter-
rent. A similar approach was shown to be effective
in Guatemala (Kettle et al. 2016).
Omission + Deterrence
The Omission + Deterrence Letter (n=15,238) is a variant
of the behavioral letter. Both omission and deter-
rence interventions were included to test whether
there are additive effects if both are used together.
That is, would combining the two interventions be
more effective than using each separately?
Omission Taxpayer-Perspective
The Omission Taxpayer-Perspective Letter (n=15,261)
is a slight but important variation to the previous let-
ter. In particular, the perspective is changed from the
tax authority to the taxpayer. Recent research on moral
judgment and decision making suggests that in ad-
dition to the deterrence threat (whether that is mild
or strong), individuals care about their moral self-
-image – they want to retain a positive view of them-
selves, and a threat to their moral self-image can be
a significant motivator of honest behavior even beyond
the deterrence threat (Mazar et al. 2008). This inter-
vention was meant to test the strength of this in the
context of tax payments (see also Shu et al., 2012).
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM POLAND 15
So far, you might have thought of your payment
delay to be accidental. However, if you disregard
this notice, you should consider it an intentional
choice of yours and think of yourself as a dis-
honest taxpayer.
So far, we have thought of your payment delay
to be accidental. However, if you disregard this
notice, we will consider it an intentional choice
of yours and we will treat you as a dishonest
taxpayer. As part of the execution procedures,
we can, for example, block your bank account,
salary, and, in addition, you will have to cover
all execution expenses that arise.
RESULTS
The presentation of the trial results from the trial
is organized in terms of the following questions:
• Which letters were most and least effective in increasing
compliance among taxpayers in arrears?
• Was there a difference in effect between soft- and hard-
-tone messages?
• Do different groups of taxpayers react differently to the
contents of letters?
WHICH LETTERS




Payment Rate (Figure 8):
Statistical significance versus the control group: All the
behavioral letters (with a payment rate of (with pay-
ment rates of 42.9 to 48.6 percent) were more effective
at bringing in payments than the control group dun-
ning letter (40.2 percent).
• The letter combining omission and deterrence mes-
sages was the most effective, with a payment rate of
48.6 percent, an 8.37 pp increase over the dunning
letter sent via regular mail and a 20.8 percent in-
crease in the number of compliant taxpayers.
• The worst-performing of the behavioral letters
in terms of raising the payment rate was the nega-
tive message on public goods letter, but statistically
its 42.9 percent payment rate was still significantly
better than the 40.2 percent rate of the dunning
letter.
• The payment rate for taxpayers sent the standard
behavioral letter was 46.3 percent – 6.12 pp more
than for recipients of the dunning letter, and
15.22 percent increase in the number of compliant
taxpayers.
Statistical significance versus the behavioral letter:
The standard behavioral letter was very effective
at mobilizing taxpayers to pay their overdue PIT.
With a payment rate of 46.3 percent, it outperformed
several letters with specific behavioral messages.
For example, the payment rate for the negative mes-
sage on public goods was 3.4 pp. below the standard
behavioral letter, implying that 7.3 percent fewer re-
cipients paid their income tax than in recipients of
the standard behavioral letter. The difference in the
payment rates is statistically significant at 5 percent
level. Similarly, the recipients of the social norm,
positive message on public goods, and deterrence
letters were less likely to pay up than those receiving
the standard behavioral letter.
One possible explanation for the relatively poor per-
formance of public goods letters may relate to the low
levels of satisfaction with certain Polish public servi-
ces. According to OECD data from 2013, confidence/
satisfaction s with the national government was only
25 percent, much lower than the OECD average of
42 percent (OECD 2015).
11
. These low levels may be due
to characteristic peculiar to public services, or they
may simply be a broad reflection of moving away from
the collectivist outlook in a post-communist setting.
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Figure 8. Payment Rates of Letters Tested
Source: Ministry of Finance data.
Notes: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Stars indicate
a significant difference from the control group (dunning letter)
– *=0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01; daggers indicate a significant difference
from the standard behavioral letter - †= 0.1., ‡=0.05, ‡‡=0.01.
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According to the 2015 OECD Government at a Glance Report for Poland, the percentage of citizens satisfied or confident about public services
was 25 percent for the national government, 36 percent for the judicial system, 43 percent for health care, and 59 percent for education.
The results of the trial also show that despite being
already effective in mobilizing payments, the stan-
dard behavioral letter can be improved. For example,
the inclusion of messages that eliminate omission
as an excuse for noncompliance (as in Omission, Omis-
sion + Deterrence, and Omission Taxpayer-Perspective
letters) significantly improves the results. Specifically,
the omission letters perform significantly better than
the behavioral letter (47.4 percent vs. 46.3 percent).
The effect of omission framed from the taxpayer’s
point of view is smaller but still statistically significant.
While including the deterrence message does not im-
prove on the standard behavioral letter, there is a signi-
ficant interaction when it is paired with the omission
letter that produces a 2.3 pp improvement in the pay-
ment rate over the standard behavioral letter.
Payment Amount (Figure 9):
The impact of the treatments on the payment amount
is estimated using the effect in terms of (1) the PLN
amount paid, and (2) the logarithm (log) of the amount
paid by the taxpayer. Both models yield similar results.
Statistical significance versus the control group: dunning
letter: Compared to the control group, each behavioral
letter letters mobilized higher average payments for
its entire sample (including those who did not pay
as well as those who did). While in the control group
the average payment per letter was PLN 1,123, for
behavioral letters the average ranged from PLN 1,244
(10.8 percent higher) to PLN 1,469 (30.9 percent higher).
Both are statistically significant.
• As with the analysis of the payment rate, the letter
that combined the omission and deterrence mes-
sages was the most effective: the average amount
paid per letter was PLN 1,469 – PLN 347 above the
dunning letter sent via regular mail. In logarithm
terms, this letter increases taxpayer payments by
25.9 percent.
• Although the negative message on public goods was
again the worst-performing letter, it was still signi-
ficantly better than the dunning letter, bringing
in an average amount per letter that was PLN 122
higher than the control group.
• The standard behavioral letter was second-best
in mobilizing higher payments, bringing in an ave-
rage of PLN 1,371, which was PLN 249 higher than
the dunning letter. In logarithms this difference
it implies a 19.3 percent increase over the dunning
regular mail letter in the amount paid.
Statistical significance versus the baseline behavioral
letter: Most of the other behavioral letters yield sta-
tistically similar results as the baseline behavioral
letter in terms of payment amount. Only the omission
+ deterrence letter attracts payments that are close to
PLN 100 higher. The other omissions letters, which
offer an excuse for noncompliance (omission and the
omission taxpayer perspective) do not yield any
significant improvement on payment amounts over
the standard behavioral message, despite increasing
the compliance rate. This suggests that the omission
message encourages payment mostly among tax-
payers with a smaller liability; combining it with the
threat (omission + deterrence) is very effective for
taxpayers who owe more. Statistically, public good
letters, both positive and negative frame, are signi-
ficantly worse than the baseline behavioral letter.
The average payment per letter was PLN 81 for the
negative and PLN 127 for the positive public letters.
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Figure 9. Payment Amounts Brought in
In PLN In Log
Source: Ministry of Finance data.
Notes: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Stars indicate a significant difference from the control group (dunning letter) – *=0.1,
**=0.05, ***=0.01; daggers indicate a significant difference from the standard behavioral letter - †= 0.1., ‡=0.05, ‡‡=0.01.
Outstanding Tax Liability (Figure 10):
Statistical significance versus the control group: dun-
ning letter: All behavioral letters were also effective
at reducing the tax liability (i.e., debt) among tax-
payers in arrears. The largest reduction, 19.3 percent,
was in response to the omission + deterrence letter;
at the other end of the spectrum, compared to the
control group the negative public good letter reduced
the debt outstanding by only 5.6 percent. The baseline
behavioral letter lowered the tax liability on average
by 14.6 percent as compared to the control group.
Statistical significance versus the behavioral letter:
Among behavioral letters statistically only omission
+ deterrence letter was significantly more effective
(by 4.8 percent) than the baseline behavior letter
in reducing the tax liability. Among those who ended
up with higher tax liability were taxpayers who re-
ceived the public good negative message (higher by
9 percent) and the social norms message (higher by
6 percent) compared to recipients of the behavioral
letter.




Besides the analysis of the impact of individual letters
on outcome measures, distinctive groups of letters
were analyzed separately. All behavioral messages
used in the experiment can be grouped in two catego-
ries: (1) soft-tone and (2) hard-tone. The soft-tone
messages correspond to social incentives, while the
hard-tone messages put emphasis on deterrence
messages. Table 2 shows the composition of the
groups.
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Figure 10. Tax Liability after Response
to Test
Source: Ministry of Finance data.
Notes: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Stars indicate
a significant difference from the control group (dunning letter)
– *=0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01; daggers indicate a significant difference
from the standard behavioral letter - †= 0.1., ‡=0.05, ‡‡=0.01.
Table 2. Classification of Letters by Content
Letter Contents Tone
Social Norm According to our records, [8] out of 10 residents in [REGION OF THE
TAXPAYER] have already paid their income tax for 2015. You are part
of a minority that has not yet fulfilled that duty.
Soft-tone
Public Good Positive Are you aware that 37.79% of your personal income tax goes to your
municipality? From this income, your municipality finances preschools,
schools, roads, and safety, benefiting everyone in your municipality
including yourself and your family. Don’t be an irresponsible inhabitant




Are you aware that 37.79% of your personal income tax goes to your
municipality? Without this income, your municipality cannot finance
preschools, schools, roads, and safety, damaging everyone
in your municipality including yourself and your family.
Don’t be an irresponsible inhabitant of your municipality and pay
your delinquent taxes!
Soft-tone
Deterrence Not paying taxes places an unfair burden on all other taxpayers,
who have honestly fulfilled their duty. We are therefore determined,
more than ever, to collect taxes from those, who avoid paying them.
As part of the execution procedures, we can, for example, block your
bank account or salary, and, in addition, you will have to cover
all execution expenses that arise.
Hard-tone




Same as deterrence message above plus:
We attach a sample Execution Order Form which we send to taxpayers
that have not paid their taxes due.
Hard-tone
Omission So far, we have thought of your payment delay to be accidental.
However, if you disregard this notice, we will consider it an intentional




Same as omission message above plus:
As part of the execution procedures, we can, for example,
block your bank account, salary, and, in addition, you will have




So far, you might have thought of your payment delay to be
accidental. However, if you disregard this notice, you should consider
it an intentional choice of yours and think of yourself as a dishonest
taxpayer.
Hard-tone
Overall, the hard-tone letters were more effective than
soft-tone letters in mobilizing payments. Not only
did more taxpayers pay income tax due, they also paid
higher amounts and their debt was reduced more.
Payment rate (Figure 11): Compared to the dunning
letter, the soft messages generally increase the pay-
ment rate – 43.9 vs. 40.2 percent, a 9 percent increase
in the number of compliant taxpayers. Hard-tone
messages also perform significantly better than the
standard dunning letter. Comparing soft-tone and
hard-tone messages with the standard behavioral
letter yields the following conclusions:
• On average, soft-tone messages perform signifi-
cantly worse than the standard behavioral letter
(43.8 vs. 46.3 percent).
• Hard messages together slightly outperform the
standard behavioral letter, but the differences are
very small and not statistically significant.
Payment amount (Figure 12): Both the standard beha-
vioral and the hard-tone letters mobilized similar
amounts per letter – amounts significantly higher
than the average amount paid by recipients of the
dunning letter. While soft-tone messages were also
clearly better than the dunning letter, they were
significantly worse than both the baseline behavioral
and the hard-tone messages and lowered the average
payment amount relative to the baseline behavioral
letter by PLN 93 per letter.
Figure 11. Payment Rate by Letter Tone
Source: Ministry of Finance data.
Notes: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Stars indicate
a significant difference from the control group (dunning letter)
– *=0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01; daggers indicate a significant difference
from the standard behavioral letter - †= 0.1., ‡=0.05, ‡‡=0.01.
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Figure 12. Payment Amount Results by Message Tone
In PLN In Log
Source: Ministry of Finance data.
Notes: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Stars indicate a significant difference from the control group (dunning letter) – *=0.1,
**=0.05, ***=0.01; daggers indicate a significant difference from the standard behavioral letter - †= 0.1., ‡=0.05, ‡‡=0.01.
Outstanding tax liability (Figure 13): The analysis of
the outstanding tax liability yields similar results.
Each type of behavioral letter significantly decreases
tax liability compared to the dunning letter control
group, but the soft-tone letters performing signifi-






Heterogeneity (Figure 14 – Figure 17): The results de-
scribed thus far reflect the average effects of treat-
ment on taxpayer compliance outcomes and implicitly
assume the effect is similar for all taxpayers. But what
is also very important is to investigate the degree
to which the impact of a given treatment varies for
specific geographic or sociodemographic groups of
interest. Further analysis of the data by subgroup
shows that in fact the treatment effects are hetero-
geneous in terms of taxpayer characteristics – the
observed intervention effects differ more from each
other than might be expected due to random error
(chance) alone.
Compliance was investigated in relation to several
characteristics: age, gender, family status (having
versus not having children), geographic variation
(urban versus rural), and the amount of tax liability.
Overall, the results reported so far hold across the
taxpayer groups in that the omission + deterrence
letter was most successful and seems to be the best
nudging strategy. Nonetheless, some interventions do
work better for certain groups:
AGE: Generally, all letters confirm that taxpayers
in their mid-40s are most responsive, after which the
difference gradually declines. However, the best-per-
forming message (omission commission + deterrence)
peaks higher among slightly older people, in their 50s,
but the soft messages reduce compliance among older
taxpayers (Annex 4). In terms of age, the response
to the public good positive letter of two age groups
Figure 13. Outstanding Tax Liability
by Message Tone
Source: Ministry of Finance data.
Notes: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Stars indicate
a significant difference from the control group (dunning letter)
– *=0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01; daggers indicate a significant difference
from the standard behavioral letter - †= 0.1., ‡=0.05, ‡‡=0.01.
(20–29 and 50–64 years old) provides a good example
of heterogeneity (Figure 14). The positive public good
messages had a positive effect among people aged
20–29 but a very negative effect among those aged
50–64 – although still better than the control group.
The difference between the treatment effects in the
two groups is 5.2 percentage points and is statistically
significant at the 0.01 level.
The heterogeneity in age groups is not entirely sur-
prising given the public goods listed in the beha-
vioral letter: preschools, schools, roads, and safety.
Schools may be considered less relevant by people
aged 50–64, who tend not to benefit from them
directly; they may even have the opposite effect if
people feel that their tax payments are going for
services that benefit others at the expense of services
that can benefit them. On the other hand, younger
taxpayers may be more motivated to contribute to
education, since 85 percent of children in Poland
attend public preschools (OECD 2013), and 59 percent
of citizens indicated that they are satisfied
or confident about the public education system
(OECD 2015). If the heterogeneity observed is in fact
due to the choice of public goods mentioned, higher
compliance might be induced by varying the types
of public goods mentioned in letters sent to people
in specific age groups.
GENDER: Women in general have a higher repay-
ment rate and are more responsive to hard-tone
messages, especially deterrence, omission commis-
sion, and omission commission + deterrence messa-
ges (Figure 15).
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Figure 14. Positive Public Good Letter
– Heterogeneity by Age Group, Percent
Payment Rate
Source: Ministry of Finance data.
Notes: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Stars indicate
a significant difference from the control group (dunning letter)
– *=0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01; daggers indicate significant differences
in the treatment effects (with respect to the standard behavioral
letter) between the two groups: †= 0.1., ‡=0.05, ‡‡=0.01.
Figure 15. Gender Heterogeneity, Percent
Payment rate
Source: Ministry of Finance data.
Notes: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Stars indicate a significant difference from the control group (dunning letter) – *=0.1,
**=0.05, ***=0.01; daggers indicate significant differences in the treatment effects (with respect to the control group dunning letter)
between the two groups: †= 0.1., ‡=0.05, ‡‡=0.01.
FAMILY STATUS (having children): Parents (self-
-reported) are not very responsive to the messages
and, for them, the behavioral letter is the most effec-
tive, together with the omission commission + deter-
rence treatment, which has very similar payment
rates. In general, hard-tone messages work on non-
parents, but not on parents (Figure 16).
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Figure 16. Family Status Heterogeneity, Percent
Payment rate
Source: Ministry of Finance data.
Notes: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Stars indicate a significant difference from the control group (dunning letter) – *=0.1,
**=0.05, ***=0.01; daggers indicate significant differences in the treatment effects (with respect to the control group dunning letter)
between the two groups: †= 0.1., ‡=0.05, ‡‡=0.01.
LOCATION: Rural taxpayers repay more and the
effects of all the treatments are quite similar. Inte-
restingly, relative to the standard behavioral letter,
the public good message works better in rural areas,
possibly because of a tighter link between the out-
come of public good expenditures and its relevance to
the community (Figure 17).
Figure 17. Location Heterogeneity, Percent
Payment rate
Source: Ministry of Finance data.
Notes: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Stars indicate a significant difference from the control group (dunning letter) – *=0.1,
**=0.05, ***=0.01; daggers indicate significant differences in the treatment effects (with respect to the control group dunning letter)
between the two groups: †= 0.1., ‡=0.05, ‡‡=0.01.
LIABILITY: Taxpayers who owe more seem to be
more responsive to the omission + deterrence messa-
ge. (For specific results on liability-related hetero-
geneity, please see Annex 5).
The analysis of heterogeneity might be useful in con-
templating the best nudging strategies for specific
segments of taxpayers. Further analysis of the data
would be needed to understand the differences in tax-
payer compliance according to their characteristics.
There are two methods of delivering paper – commu-
nication from the Polish tax office to taxpayers, regi-
stered mail and regular mail. This part of the experi-
ment was designed to verify statistically if the method
of delivery affects the payment rate, the payment
amount, and the outstanding tax liability. The results
can inform the Polish authorities on the costs and
benefits of using both.
In the registered mail delivery method, the Post Office
is obliged to deliver the letter in person within three
working days after it is sent, though in fact it rarely
takes that long. The taxpayer confirms receipt with
a signature, and the tax office is notified that the
letter was successfully delivered. If the taxpayer
is not present at the time of delivery, the post office
leaves a notification and the taxpayer has seven days
from the first delivery attempt to pick up the letter
at the post office.
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If the letter is not picked up within
this period, the post office issues a second notification
with another seven-day. After 14 days, a letter that
has not been picked up is returned to the tax office but
is considered delivered because of the notifications.
After that, all legal proceedings can be undertaken.
The process is highly formalized and registered
a dunning letter is a first step of execution pro-
ceedings. The cost of sending the letter by registered
mail is PLN 6.20 (PLN 14.96 including administra-
tive costs).
The regular mail delivery method is very simple;
the post office delivers the letter to the mailbox of
the taxpayer, normally within three working days
after the sending date. The cost per letter is PLN 2.00
(PLN 9.20 including administrative costs).
The content and looks of the dunning letter sent by
regular mail and the standard dunning letter sent
by registered mail were very similar. Small changes
were introduced in the former to reflect the changed
delivery method and the need to remove some phra-
sing specific to the standard dunning letter:
• “Receipt confirmation” was removed as the delivery
method changed.
• “Dunning Letter No: X/2016 dated…” was removed
because the letter was no longer a formal dunning
letter and hence was not assigned a number.
• “Dunning letter costs” was removed from the table
with information on liability and interest as the
not imposing any additional cost obligation on the
taxpayer.
• “Dunning letter” was replaced by “letter.”
• For legal reasons a slight change of tone was intro-
duced in the following sentence:
Standard dunning letter delivered by registered
mail: “Failure to perform the said duty by indica-
ted deadline shall result in referral of the case
to execution proceedings, thereby generating costs
of execution proceedings to be covered first.”
Dunning letter delivered by regular mail: “Failure
to perform the said duty by indicated deadline may
result in referral of the case to execution pro-
ceedings, thereby generating costs of execution
proceedings to be covered first.”
The English and the original Polish versions of both
letters can be found in Annex 7.
This trial had two arms: the standard dunning letter
was sent to taxpayers by registered mail and the mo-
dified dunning letter by regular mail.
The sample covered 11,963 taxpayers in arrears each
owing more than PLN 50. Taxpayers in the sample
were randomly assigned to either
1. a group that was sent the original dunning letter
by registered mail (n=5,872); or
2. a group that was sent the modified dunning letter
by regular mail (n=6,091).
The analysis of the outcomes of the delivery method
test found that the dunning letter sent by registered
mail slightly outperformed the other letter, but the
differences in outcomes are very small and statisti-
cally insignificant (Figure 19)
13
. Specifically:
• Payment rate for the regular mail letter was
40.2 percent, slightly below the 40.7 percent rate
for the registered letter.
• Payment amount was PLN 1123 for the regular letter
and PLN 1159 for the registered letter, a difference of
PLN36 per letter.
• Similarly, differences in logs for both the payment
amount and the outstanding tax liability were very
small and insignificant.
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12
The taxpayer may also authorize another person to pick it up.
13
While the results show no statistical difference between the two delivery methods, further analysis may be needed to understand better
the results, for example with regards to the number of dunning letters sent by registered mail and not delivered to the taxpayer.
TESTING THE DELIVERY
METHOD
Figure 18. Sample Size and Treatment
Assignments
Source: Polish authorities.
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Figure 19. Outcomes for Delivery Method
Payment rate Payment amount (PLN) Payment amount (log) Outstanding liability (log)
Source: Ministry of Finance data.
Notes: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Stars indicate a significant difference from the control group (dunning letter).
COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS
The purpose of the cost-benefit analysis is to demon-
strate the potential fiscal gains of the most effec-
tive compliance strategy vis-a-vis the baseline, i.e.
the dunning letter.
14
The cost-benefit analysis of the
treatments is based on the results from the earlier
estimations on the payment rate and the amount
paid. The Polish Tax Authority estimates that the
cost of sending each reminder letter by regular mail,
including costs of postage and staff time associated
with preparing the letter is PLN 9.20. The cost of sen-
ding each standard dunning letter by registered mail
is PLN 14.96. The calculations are presented in Table 3
and Table 4.
The conclusion is that changing the delivery method
from registered to regular mail can reduce the cost
to the Tax Authority, and the use of more powerful
messages (omission + deterrence letter) would have
increased the payment rate and hence the effective-
ness of the taxpayer notification system.
The total cost of sending any letter by regular mail
to all 149,925 taxpayers in the sample would have been
PLN 1,379,310. Regarding the benefits, the best-per-
forming letter (omission + deterrence) significantly
increased the payment rate and the amount paid
relative to the dunning letter control group. If the
omission + deterrence letter had been sent to all
149,925 taxpayers in the sample, it would have ge-
nerated an estimated PLN 39,328,742 in additional
revenues compared to the dunning letter control
group. In other words, the omission + deterrence let-
ter would have been generated 28 times more addi-
tional revenue than sending the letters would have
cost. The baseline behavioral letter would have
brought in an additional PLN 27,581,129 relative to the
control letter – almost 20 times more than the cost
of sending the regular letters.
It is worthwhile to add that currently the tax offices
are required to follow up with the taxpayer using
a registered mail dunning letter. Considering that
the trial found no statistically significant difference
in payment rate and payment amount between the
two types of delivery, the difference in the costs
(PLN 14.96 and PLN 9.20) represents a loss for the tax
offices. For the whole sample of 2015 taxpayers
in arrears, the additional cost of sending registered
rather than regular letters would be about PLN 863,568
– 62 percent more than using regular mail.
These calculations represent an assessment of po-
tential benefits related to using the most effective
approach of notifying taxpayers. However, as this
has not been applied in reality (the most effective
behavioral letters was not sent out to all taxpayers),
the revenue generated by the trial itself was also
estimated: it brought in an estimated PLN 90,154,155
at a cost of PLN 1,413,133, thus generating PLN 88,741,023
for the budget.
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14
The cost and benefit analysis presented in the report does not take into account the additional costs associated with handling
the complaints filed with the tax authorities by recipients of certain behavioral letters (mainly hard tone). The Ministry of Finance
does not have data on the total number of complaints in Poland and the costs associated with their handling, hence they are not part of
the cost-benefit analysis. Data from the Tax Chamber in Warsaw show that only 7 complaints were filed formally, while more than
30 thousand letters were sent in Mazowieckie region, which suggests that the cost associated with complaints was not very large.
However, the employees of the Tax Offices also reported to have received over 3,000 phone calls and emails regarding the content of
behavioral communications. In addition, it should be also noted that there might be other tools that can improve tax compliance apart
from behaviorally informed letters, but identifying them is beyond the scope of the report.
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Scenario 1: Using the most effective letter with regards to all taxpayers
Omission commission, admin, deterrence 149,925 1469.3 48.6 9.20 1,379,310 107,003,434 105,624,124
Control group (dunning letter) 149,925 1122.7 40.2 9.20 1,379,310 67,674,693 66,295,383
Dunning registered 149,925 1159.0 40.7 14.96 2,242,878 70,696,466 68,453,588
Difference compared to control group – 39,328,742 39,328,742
Difference compared to dunning registered (863,568) 36,306,969 37,170,537
Scenario 2: Using standard behavioral letter with regards to all taxpayers
Standard behavioral 149,925 1371.4 46.3 9.20 1,379,310 95,255,822 93,876,512
Difference compared to control group – 27,581,129 27,581,129
Difference compared to dunning registered (863,568) 24,559,356 25,422,924
Source: World Bank staff based on Ministry of Finance data.


























Control group (dunning letter) 6,091 1122.7 40.2 9.20 56,037 2,749,418 2,693,381 48.1
Dunning registered 5,872 1159.0 40.7 14.96 87,845 2,768,915 2,681,070 30.5
Public goods (negative) 15,350 1289.9 42.9 9.20 141,220 8,496,603 8,355,383 59.2
Social norms 15,474 1299.7 43.7 9.20 142,361 8,795,341 8,652,980 60.8
Deterrence 15,442 1361.6 44.8 9.20 142,066 9,410,073 9,268,007 65.2
Public goods (positive) 15,424 1244.4 44.8 9.20 141,901 8,595,010 8,453,109 59.6
Standard behavioral 15,232 1371.4 46.3 9.20 140,134 9,677,750 9,537,616 68.1
Omission commission, taxpayer 15,261 1350.7 46.6 9.20 140,401 9,596,605 9,456,203 67.4
Deterrence with executive order 15,292 1342.0 47.1 9.20 140,686 9,673,336 9,532,649 67.8
Omission commission, admin 15,249 1317.9 47.3 9.20 140,291 9,515,544 9,375,253 66.8
Omission commission, admin,
deterrence 15,238 1469.3 48.6 9.20 140,190 10,875,560 10,735,370 76.6
Total 149,925 1,413,133 90,154,155 88,741,023 62.8
Source: World Bank staff based on Ministry of Finance data.
CONCLUSIONS
This trial confirms that sending a letter to taxpayers
in arrears works as an effective reminder to promote
compliance with Poland’s PIT laws. The results sug-
gest that adapting a behavioral design in taxpayer
communications could produce considerable gains.
All behavioral letters induced higher payment rates
and amounts and decreased the amount of tax liabili-
ty relative to both the control group (modified dun-
ning letter sent by regular mail) and the original dun-
ning letter. Hard-tone messages proved very effec-
tive in mobilizing higher payments, but the evidence
of heterogeneity across taxpayer characteristics also
suggests that calibrating reminder messages to cer-
tain groups of taxpayers could effectively increase
outcome measures.
Moreover, since there are no statistically significant
differences in delivery method outcomes, the option
of sending reminders by regular mail can simplify
execution procedures in Poland without affecting
revenue collection.
The trial results provide a compelling case for rigo-
rous testing small adaptations to communications
to Polish taxpayers and demonstrate that without
the need for new legislation current communication
processes can be enhanced at low cost to promote tax
compliance.
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM POLAND 27
REFERENCES
Anderson, C., Keltner, D., & John, O. P. 2003. “Emotional convergence between people over time”. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 1054–1068.
Ariel, B. 2012. “Deterrence and Moral Persuasion Effects on Corporate Tax Compliance: Findings From A Ran-
domized Controlled Trial.” Criminology, 50, 27–69.
Blumenthal, M., Christian, C. and Slemrod, J. 2001. “Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence
From a Controlled Experiment In Minnesota.” National Tax Journal, 54, 125–136.
Brockmeyer, Anne; Hernandez, Marco; Kettle, Stewart; Smith, Spencer Douglas. 2016. “Casting the Tax Net Wider:
Experimental Evidence from Costa Rica.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper; No. WPS 7850. Washing-
ton, D.C.: World Bank Group.
Castro, L. and Scartascini, C. 2013. “Tax Compliance and Enforcement in the Pampas: Evidence from a Field
Experiment.” Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper Series. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American
Development Bank.
Castro L., and C. Scartascini. 2015. “Tax Compliance at Enforcement in the Pampas: Evidence from a Field
Experiment.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 116(C): 65–82.
DeScioli, P., K. Asao, and R. Kurzban. 2012. “Omissions and Byproducts across Moral Domains.” PLOS ONE 7(10):
e46963.
Del Carpio, L. 2013. “Are the Neighbours Cheating? Evidence from a Social Norm Experiment on Property Taxes
in Peru.” Princeton University Working Paper.
Dwenger, N., Kleven, H., Rasul, I. and Rincke, J. 2014. “Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance:
Evidence From A Field Experiment In Germany.” Mimeo.
Gerber, A.S., Rogers, T. 2009. Descriptive Social Norms and Motivation to Vote: Everybody’s Voting and so
Should You. Journal of Politics 71 (1): 1–14.
Haidt, J. 2003. “The moral emotions.” In Handbook of Affective Sciences, edited by R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer,
and H. H. Goldsmith, 852–70. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Hallsworth, M. 2013. “The Omission Bias.” Unpublished paper.
Hallsworth, M., List, J. A., Metcalfe, R. D., and Vlaev, I. (2014). “The Behavioralist as Tax Collector: Using Natural
Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance” (No. W20007). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hoffman, M. L. 1982a. “Affect and Moral Development. In New Directions for Child Development: Emotional
Development edited by D. Ciccetti and P. Hesse, No. 16. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Hoffman, M. L. 1982b. “Development of Prosocial Motivation: Empathy and Guilt. In The Development of Prosocial
Behavior, edited by N. Eisenberg. New York: Academic Press.
Kettle, Stewart; Hernandez, Marco; Ruda, Simon; Sanders, Michael. 2016. “Behavioral interventions in tax comp-
liance: evidence from Guatemala.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper; No. WPS 7690. Washington, D.C.
World Bank Group.
28 APPLYING BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS TO IMPROVE TAX COLLECTION
Kleven, H. J., Knudsen, M. B., Kreiner, C. T., Pedersen, S. and Saez, E. 2011. “Unwilling or Unable to Cheat?
Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark.” Econometrica, 79, 651–692.
Lewis, H. B. 1971. Shame and Guilt in Neurosis. New York: International Universities Press.
Lewis, M. 1993. “Self-conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt. In Handbook of emotions,
edited by M. Lewis and J. Haviland, 563–573. New York: Guilford Press.
Mazar, N., O. Amir, and D. Ariely. 2008. “The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Mainte-
nance.” Journal of Marketing Research 45(6): 633–44.
Miller, D. W., and L. J. Marks. 1997. “The Effects of Imagery-evoking Radio Advertising Strategies on Effective
Responses.” Psychology & Marketing 14(4): 35–50.
OECD. 2013. “Country Note – Education at a Glance 2013: Poland.” Paris: OECD.
OECD. 2015, “Country Fact Sheet – Government at a Glance 2015: Poland.” Paris: OECD.
Ortega, D. and Sanguinetti, P. (2013). “Deterrence and Reciprocity Effects on Tax Compliance: Experimental
Evidence from Venezuela.” Working Paper.
Pomeranz, D. 2013. “No taxation without information: Deterrence and self-enforcement in the value added tax.”
(No. w19199). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Samuelson, W., and R. Zeckhauser. 1988. “Status Quo Bias in Decision Making.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
1(1): 7–59.
Shu, Lisa L., Nina Mazar, Francesca Gino, Dan Ariely, and Max H. Bazerman. 2012. “Signing at the Beginning
Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases Dishonest Self-reports in Comparison to Signing at the End.” Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (38): 15197–00.
Sunstein, C.R. 2015. “Choosing Not to Choose.” Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Torgler, B. (2007). “Tax Compliance and Tax Morale: A Theoretical And Empirical Analysis”, Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. 1981. “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice.” Science 211(4481):
453–58.
Yoo, J., and M. Kim. 2014. “The Effects of Online Product Presentation on Consumer Responses: A Mental Imagery
Perspective.” Journal of Business Research 67(11): 2464–72.
Wenzel, M. 2005. “Misperceptions of Social Norms about Tax Compliance: From Theory to Intervention.”
Journal of Economic Psychology, 26, 862–883.
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM POLAND 29
ANNEX 1.
APPLYING BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS TO TAX COMMUNICATIONS
IN POLAND: EVIDENCE FROM A PERSONAL INCOME
TAX LETTER TRIAL
1
Experiment Design: The goal of the trial was to in-
crease tax payments among taxpayers in arrears
2
of the Personal Income Tax (PIT) in two regions
in Poland: Lubuskie and Wielkopolskie.
3
The sample
covered 31,929 taxpayers in arrears that each had
a tax liability of more than PLN 50. Taxpayers in this
sample were randomly assigned to one of three
groups: (1) a control group that was not sent a re-
minder letter (n=10,627); (2) a group that was sent
the original Polish Tax Office reminder letter, stan-
dard dunning letter (n=10,534); and (3) a group that
was sent a letter adapted using behavioral design
(n=10,768).
Here is a brief summary of each letter:
• Dunning Letter (n=10,534): This is the original let-
ter, sent by registered mail, that the Polish Tax
Office regularly sends to taxpayers in arrears
to remind them to pay their taxes. The letter,
which has a formal tone, states the legal basis for
this type of communication.
4
It sets out informa-
tion about the tax liability and asks the taxpayer
to calculate the accrued interests, providing ge-
neral guidelines for the calculation but not provi-
ding any example. The letter also has a deterrent
message, highlighting that “failure to perform
[pay] by the indicated deadline shall result in re-
ferral of the case to execution proceedings thereby
generating costs of execution proceedings to be
covered first.”
• Behavioral Letter (n=10,768): The original letter was
adapted using behavioral design based on two core
principles: simplicity/clarity, and inclusion of beha-
viorally-informed messages. Instead of being sent by
registered mail, the behavioral letter went by regular
mail. In terms of content, the behavioral letter (1) in-
cluded a call-to-action at the top explaining what
the taxpayer needed to do within a defined period:
“Please pay your income tax by June 10, 2015”; (2) in-
cluded a social norms message: “According to our
records, [percent] % of residents in [the Taxpayer’s
Region] have already paid their income tax for 2014”;
(3) provided personal information about the amount
due, and had a table that calculated the interest pay-
ment that would be due related to the date when
the payment was made; (4) explained how to make
a payment; (5) included a deterrent message: “If you
do not pay your taxes, you could be subject to admi-
nistrative proceedings…. We will be checking to see
how you respond to this letter”; and (6) informed
taxpayers what to do if they were unable to pay the
full tax liability at that time.
Results: Results are reported for four outcome measu-
res: payment rate, payment amount, outstanding tax
liability, and payment delay.
• Payment rate (Figure A1.1): Both the original dun-
ning letter and the behavioral letter were effective
at increasing the number of late taxpayers who
made a PIT payment. After 12 weeks, 27.6 percent
of taxpayers in the control group had done so.
The payment rate for those who were sent the ori-
ginal dunning letter was 29.8 percent, which is
2.2 percentage points (pp) higher than the control
group. The behavioral letter was most effective
at promoting tax compliance: the payment rate for
those who received it was 32.2 percent, 4.6 pp higher
than the control group (i.e. a 17 percent increase
vis a vis the control group), and 2.4 pp higher than
those that were sent the original dunning letter
(representing an 8 percent increase over the origi-
nal). The effects are statistically significant.
• Payment amount (Figures A1.2): The behavioral
letter proved to be the most effective in mobilizing
higher tax payment amounts relative to both the
control group and the original dunning letter.
Figure A1.2 shows the effect of the letters on the
amount paid in PLN; the behavioral letter increased
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1
Based on Applying Behavioral Insights to Tax Communications in Poland: Evidence from a Personal Income Tax Letter Trial, World Bank
and Behavioural Insights Team, February 2016, draft available upon request from ekorczyc@worldbank.org
or marcohernandez@worldbank.org
2
Taxpayers in arrears were defined as those who had filed their PIT declarations on time (by April 30, 2015) but had failed to pay their tax
liability by the deadline.
3
Lubuskie and Wielkopolskie are located in the northwest of Poland. Together their populations totaled about 4.5 million in 2014,
12 percent of Poland’s total population. In 2014, there were about 1.9 million PIT taxpayers in the two regions, equivalent to 12.4 percent of
total PIT taxpayers.
4
The Resolution of the Ministry of Finance of May 20, 2014 specifies procedures for creditors of monetary claims in undertaking to
apply enforcement measures (Journal of Laws of 2014, item 656).
the average amount paid per letter by PLN 169 rela-
tive to the control group (equivalent to a 15 percent
increase) and by PLN 225 (a 21 percent increase)
compared to the original dunning letter.
• Outstanding tax liability (Figure A1.3): The beha-
vioral letter was also effective at reducing the out-
standing tax liability (the debt) among taxpayers
in arrears. On average, the group who received
the behavioral letter had a 4 percent lower tax lia-
bility than recipients of the original dunning letter
– a statistically significant difference.
• Timing of payment: Both letters were effective
in bringing payments in earlier, which reduces
administrative costs. On average, taxpayers who
were sent a reminder letter paid their PIT 16 days
earlier than the control group.
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Figure A1.1. Taxpayers Who Paid their
Personal Income Tax after 12 Weeks,
Percent
Source: Polish Tax Department, Ministry of Finance, and World
Bank estimates.
Notes: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Stars indicate
a significant difference from the control group (at the 0.10, 0.05,
and 0.01 levels) and daggers (†) indicate a significant difference
between the two treatments.
Figure A1.2. Average Amount Paid, PLN Figure A1.3. Outstanding (log) Tax Liability,
Percent
Source: Polish Tax Department, Ministry of Finance, and World Bank estimates.
Notes: Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Stars indicate a significant difference from the control group (at the 0.10, 0.05,
and 0.01 levels) and daggers (†) a significant difference between the two treatments.
Conclusions: This trial found that sending a letter
to late taxpayers is effective in promoting compliance
with Poland’s PIT laws. In particular, the behavioral
letter induced higher payment rates and payment
amounts and decreased tax liability relative to both
the control group and recipients of the original dun-
ning letter. The letters also helped to speed up pay-
ment. The results make a compelling case for rigo-
rous testing of small adaptations to communications
to taxpayers and show that current communications
can be enhanced to promote tax compliance at low
cost and without the need for new legislation. None-
theless, caution is required in interpreting these
results for two reasons: (1) The data are limited to
a period of 12 weeks from the date the letters were
sent out. The long-run effects might change if, for
instance, the reminder effect of the letters fades over
time. It is thus recommended that outcomes be closely
monitored in subsequent months and the analysis
updated accordingly. (2) The behavioral letter diffe-
red from the original dunning letter in more than one
respect: it was simplified, included a social norms
message, and had a milder tone than the original dun-
ning letter, and because it was sent by regular mail
it did not require the recipient to sign. Thus, a lesson
learned from this trial is that better understanding
of which small changes to the behavioral letter con-
tributed the most to increase tax compliance would
require isolating each effect by new randomized con-
trolled trials to test each message specifically.
ANNEX 2.
MAIN REGRESSION MODEL RESULTS: SIGNIFICANCE IN TERMS
OF THE REGULAR DUNNING LETTER





















Controls Controls PPLN w/Controls Controls Controls
Dunning
registered
0.005 0.006 36.357 38.281 35.781 0.050 0.057 -0.012 -0.022
(0.009) (0.009) (88.101) (81.563) (80.478) (0.062) (0.062) (0.072) (0.066)
Standard
behavioral
0.061*** 0.062*** 248.699*** 260.068*** 224.646*** 0.433*** 0.434*** -0.347*** -0.346***
(0.008) (0.007) (73.030) (67.611) (55.760) (0.052) (0.051) (0.060) (0.055)
Social norms
0.035*** 0.036*** 177.070** 182.741*** 164.420*** 0.263*** 0.265*** -0.225*** -0.234***
(0.008) (0.007) (72.867) (67.459) (58.597) (0.051) (0.051) (0.060) (0.055)
Positive public
good
0.046*** 0.045*** 121.721* 137.417** 115.564* 0.301*** 0.299*** -0.269*** -0.256***
(0.008) (0.007) (72.900) (67.489) (60.685) (0.052) (0.051) (0.060) (0.055)
Negative public
good
0.027*** 0.028*** 167.235** 155.223** 155.893*** 0.209*** 0.211*** -0.150** -0.166***
(0.008) (0.007) (72.950) (67.537) (60.402) (0.052) (0.051) (0.060) (0.055)
Deterrence
0.045*** 0.046*** 238.938*** 218.164*** 216.627*** 0.331*** 0.326*** -0.286*** -0.291***
(0.008) (0.007) (72.888) (67.481) (58.476) (0.052) (0.051) (0.060) (0.055)
Deterrence with
execution form
0.069*** 0.069*** 219.358*** 238.546*** 200.365*** 0.475*** 0.474*** -0.432*** -0.417***




0.071*** 0.072*** 195.273*** 204.078*** 180.034*** 0.474*** 0.477*** -0.405*** -0.411***





0.084*** 0.084*** 346.603*** 370.048*** 302.064*** 0.588*** 0.592*** -0.467*** -0.462***




0.063*** 0.064*** 228.013*** 233.245*** 207.583*** 0.445*** 0.448*** -0.381*** -0.389***
(0.008) (0.007) (73.010) (67.592) (56.389) (0.052) (0.051) (0.060) (0.055)
Constant
0.402*** 0.683*** 1122.670*** -1453.107*** 2.535*** 2.555*** 4.905*** 0.559**
(0.006) (0.034) (61.724) (310.812) (0.044) (0.234) (0.051) (0.252)
N 149925 149925 149925 149925 149925 149925 149925 149925 149925
Notes: Stars indicate a significant difference from the control group at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels.
ANNEX 3.
MAIN REGRESSION MODEL RESULTS: SIGNIFICANCE IN TERMS
OF THE STANDARD BEHAVIORAL LETTER


























-0.056*** -0.056*** -212.342*** -221.787*** -0.383*** -0.377*** 0.335*** 0.325*** -0.584***
(0.008) (0.008) (73.996) (68.504) (0.052) (0.052) (0.061) (0.055) (0.114)
Dunning regular
-0.061*** -0.062*** -248.699*** -260.068*** -0.433*** -0.434*** 0.347*** 0.346*** -0.336***
(0.008) (0.007) (73.030) (67.611) (0.052) (0.051) (0.060) (0.055) (0.113)
Social norms
-0.026*** -0.026*** -71.629 -77.326 -0.170*** -0.169*** 0.122*** 0.112*** 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (54.983) (50.903) (0.039) (0.038) (0.045) (0.041) (0.082)
Positive public
good
-0.015*** -0.017*** -126.978** -122.651** -0.132*** -0.135*** 0.078* 0.090** 0.033
(0.006) (0.006) (55.028) (50.944) (0.039) (0.038) (0.045) (0.041) (0.082)
Negative public
good
-0.034*** -0.034*** -81.464 -104.844** -0.224*** -0.223*** 0.196*** 0.180*** -0.037
(0.006) (0.006) (55.093) (51.005) (0.039) (0.038) (0.045) (0.041) (0.083)
Deterrence
-0.016*** -0.016*** -9.761 -41.904 -0.102*** -0.108*** 0.060 0.056 -0.117
(0.006) (0.006) (55.012) (50.930) (0.039) (0.038) (0.045) (0.041) (0.082)
Deterrence with
execution form
0.008 0.007 -29.341 -21.522 0.042 0.040 -0.085* -0.070* -0.061
(0.006) (0.006) (55.145) (51.053) (0.039) (0.039) (0.045) (0.041) (0.081)
Omission
commission
0.010* 0.010* -53.426 -55.990 0.041 0.043 -0.058 -0.065 -0.008




0.022*** 0.022*** 97.904* 109.980** 0.155*** 0.158*** -0.120*** -0.116*** -0.127




0.002 0.003 -20.686 -26.823 0.012 0.014 -0.034 -0.043 -0.131
(0.006) (0.006) (55.173) (51.078) (0.039) (0.039) (0.045) (0.041) (0.081)
Constant
0.463*** 0.745*** 1371.369*** -1193.039*** 2.968*** 2.989*** 4.559*** 0.213 8.822***
(0.004) (0.034) (39.032) (307.542) (0.028) (0.232) (0.032) (0.249) (0.058)
N 149925 149925 149925 149925 149925 149925 149925 149925 68002
Notes: Stars indicate a significant difference from the control group at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels.
ANNEX 4.
TREATMENT EFFECTS (VERSUS THE STANDARD DUNNING
LETTER) OF DIFFERENT LETTERS BY TAXPAYER AGE
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ANNEX 5.
TREATMENT EFFECTS (VERSUS STANDARD DUNNING LETTER)
OF DIFFERENT LETTERS BY INITIAL TAX LIABILITY
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ANNEX 6.
DOES THE CUT-OFF DATE MATTER?
The results presented in the report are based on the
data obtained from the authorities by June 13, 2016.
Up to that date, the tax administration undertook
no other enforcement activities. After that date it is
harder to interpret the findings because there were
other interventions, such as enforcement activities
by tax offices. For example, a number of taxpayers
from all treatment arms who had failed to pay by
June 13 were sent dunning letter by registered mail,
and executive proceedings were initiated for tax-
payers who had been sent registered dunning letters
as part of the experiment. These factors create poten-
tially confounding effects that might affect the validi-
ty of the estimates. Nonetheless, the results using as
cut-off dates the first (June 13) and the last (August 8)
monitoring rounds are compared here (Table A3.1).
The findings:
1. The registered letter becomes more productive,
especially with regard to the amount paid and the
number of days for repayment.
2. All behavioral letters become less effective, espe-
cially in terms of payment amount.
3. The effect of behavioral letters on days to repay-
ment becomes negative (with regards to dunning
regular) – an indication that the effect on the
composition on the sample of those who pay
attenuates and becomes more homogeneous
across treatments – and those who were sent the
regular letter start repaying – an indication that
for them slower repayment is slower than for
other taxpayers. This confirms that the executive
measures partly make up for the fact that non-
-behavioral messages are not as effective.
4. From the administration point of view, omission
commission messages lose most of their effective-
ness edge over the behavioral standard letter;
it appears that these messages were effective
in showing “seriousness of intent” on part of the
administration but once the intent is carried out
via executive proceedings, the messages lose bite.
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Table A3.1. Results at Different Cut-off Dates
Payment rate Log Payment Amount Log Liability Payment Delay
June 13 August 8 June 13 August 8 June 13 August 8 June 13 August 8
Dunning regular
0.005 0.009 0.026 116.204 0.006 0.068* -0.249* -0.715**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.031) (110.439) (0.042) (0.035) (0.139) (0.363)
Baseline
behavioral
0.061*** 0.038*** 0.193*** 172.743* -0.146*** 0.137*** 0.336*** -1.421***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.026) (91.546) (0.035) (0.029) (0.113) (0.300)
Social norms
0.035*** 0.018** 0.120*** 87.464 -0.088** 0.079*** 0.345*** -0.984***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.026) (91.341) (0.035) (0.029) (0.114) (0.300)
Public good
positive
0.046*** 0.025*** 0.121*** 16.779 -0.107*** 0.073** 0.369*** -1.113***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.026) (91.383) (0.035) (0.029) (0.114) (0.300)
Public good
Negative
0.027*** 0.012 0.100*** 89.185 -0.056 0.058** 0.298*** -0.784***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.026) (91.445) (0.035) (0.029) (0.114) (0.301)
Deterrence
0.045*** 0.022*** 0.149*** 117.128 -0.114*** 0.085*** 0.219* -1.581***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.026) (91.368) (0.035) (0.029) (0.114) (0.300)
Deterrence with
executive order
0.069*** 0.042*** 0.202*** 121.178 -0.188*** 0.138*** 0.275** -1.842***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.026) (91.495) (0.035) (0.029) (0.113) (0.299)
Omission
0.071*** 0.039*** 0.193*** 28.626 -0.161*** 0.105*** 0.328*** -2.109***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.026) (91.531) (0.035) (0.029) (0.113) (0.300)
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM POLAND 37
Payment rate Log Payment Amount Log Liability Payment Delay
June 13 August 8 June 13 August 8 June 13 August 8 June 13 August 8
Omission
+ deterrence
0.084*** 0.051*** 0.259*** 240.580*** -0.193*** 0.179*** 0.208* -2.377***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.026) (91.541) (0.035) (0.029) (0.113) (0.299)
Omission
taxpayer view
0.063*** 0.037*** 0.192*** 146.909 -0.147*** 0.138*** 0.205* -1.966***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.026) (91.521) (0.035) (0.029) (0.113) (0.300)
Constant
0.402*** 0.552*** 4.888*** 1880.912*** 6.258*** 5.343*** 8.486*** 17.007***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.022) (77.374) (0.029) (0.024) (0.098) (0.256)
N 149925 149925 149925 149925 149925 149925 68002 87218
Notes: Stars indicate a significant difference from the control group (at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels).
ANNEX 7.
CONTROL LETTERS AND EXPERIMENT LETTER VARIANTS
REGISTERED Dunning Letter – ENGLISH translation
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REGULAR MAIL Dunning Letter – ENGLISH translation
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BEHAVIORAL BASELINE LETTER – ENGLISH translation
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SOCIAL NORM LETTER – ENGLISH translation
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PUBLIC GOOD POSITIVE LETTER – ENGLISH translation
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PUBLIC GOOD NEGATIVE LETTER – ENGLISH translation
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DETERRENCE LETTER – ENGLISH translation
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DETERRENCE LETTER + EXECUTION ORDER – ENGLISH translation
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OMISSION LETTER – ENGLISH translation
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OMISSION + DETERRENCE LETTER – ENGLISH translation
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OMISSION TAXPAYER’S VIEW – ENGLISH translation
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REGISTERED MAIL DUNNING LETTER – Original Polish Version
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REGULAR MAIL DUNNING LETTER – Original Polish Version
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BEHAVIORAL BASELINE LETTER – Original Polish Version
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SOCIAL NORM LETTER – Original Polish Version
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PUBLIC GOOD POSITIVE LETTER – Original Polish Version
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PUBLIC GOOD NEGATIVE LETTER – Original Polish Version
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DETERRENCE LETTER – Original Polish Version
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DETERRENCE LETTER + EXECUTION ORDER – Original Polish Version
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OMISSION LETTER – Original Polish Version
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OMISSION + DETERRENCE LETTER – Original Polish Version
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OMISSION TAXPAYER’S VIEW – Original Polish Version
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ANNEX 8.
SAMPLE EXECUTION ORDER
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NOTES




